

















Much attention has been given to the question of ontic (or metaphysical) vagueness, that is, the question of whether or not there is vagueness in the language-independent and mind-independent world.  This attention is often focused on whether or not certain concrete entities – tables, cats, clouds, and mountains, etc. – are vague in the sense of having indeterminate, or fuzzy spatial boundaries.  As such, this discussion often does not focus on the ways (if any) in which some other important furniture of the language-independent, thought-independent world is vague, that is, the way that certain abstract objects (if any) are vague.
But this is not how the discussion always proceeds.  For instance, some have indirectly addressed the issue of vague abstracta by claiming that certain concrete entities are themselves vague in virtue of being borderline instances of a vague (platonic) property.  And some have directly addressed vague abstracta, in certain cases arguing that various kinds of abstracta are vague, in others arguing that no abstract object is vague (usually based on a universal rejection of all ontic vagueness combined with an acceptance of a theory of linguistic or epistemic vagueness).  In this paper I wish to focus in this paper on a way in which some abstracta are vague that has not received any attention (or at least very little)​[1]​ in the literature.
To begin, I will briefly cover some of the territory already covered in the literature regarding vague abstracta – partly to provide some of the background of this discussion so that my own novel treatment may receive its proper place therein, but also to make more palatable the general picture of a world that contains vague abstracta.  This will occur in Section 2.  I then wish to discuss in the following Section two different types of abstracta and a peculiar, yet legitimate sense in which these objects are themselves vague.  This discussion will present, I believe, a novel categorization in the sense of presenting a way of being a metaphysically vague object that has received no (or very little) attention in the literature (of course, I do not intend to be presenting a way of being vague that is novel – i.e., a way that has only recently come into existence!).  In Section 4, I will reexamine some of the more “traditional” kinds of alleged vague abstracta discussed in Section 2 and discuss whether any of these objects are vague in the peculiar way presented.  In Section 5, I will consider two sorts of objections to the view here delineated and explain my replies.  I intend to argue that since neither the linguistic nor the epistemic theory of vagueness can give an adequate treatment to this novel category of vague abstracta, we should admit that some abstract objects themselves really are vague in the way discussed.  I will conclude with some remarks about the distinction between abstract and concrete entities, and the bearing that the results here seem to have on characterizing that distinction.

2. Some extant views on the ways in which some “traditional” types 
of abstracta are vague

All of the following have been taken by various prominent philosophers at various times to be language-independent, mind-independent abstract objects (let us call them traditional types of abstracta): sets, concepts, properties, propositions, and states of affairs.  And all of these traditional abstracta have been taken by various prominent philosophers at various times to be themselves vague constituents of the world.  For the reasons stated in the Introduction, I wish now to briefly recapitulate some of these views.
Of all the traditional abstracta alleged to be vague, sets have probably received the most attention.  Michael Tye (1990), one prominent believer in vague sets, explains them thusly:

I classify a set S as vague …if and only if (a) it has borderline members and (b) there is no determinate fact of the matter about whether there are objects that are neither members, borderline members, nor non-members. (536)

According to Tye, then, the set of tall men, for instance, itself counts as a vague object.  Men who are over 6 feet 6 inches are definitely members of this set, yet men under 5 feet 6 inches definitely fail to be members.  There are some men, however, which are borderline members, and it seems that there just is no determinate, objective fact of the matter about whether each of these borderline cases is in the set or outside it. (536)​[2]​
This view of sets has, of course, met with considerable controversy, especially among those wishing to retain all of classical set theory.  A widely accepted thesis about sets has it that set membership must be precise; consider, for example, the following alleged reductio by R.M. Sainsbury (1990):

Suppose there were a set of things of which “red” is true: it would be the set of red things.  However, “red” is vague: there are objects of which it is neither the case that “red” is (definitely) true nor the case that “red” is (definitely) not true.  Such an object would neither definitely belong to the set of red things nor definitely fail to belong to this set.  But this is impossible, by the very nature of sets.  Hence there is no set of red things. (252)

Whatever is true of vagueness, however, one must admit that it is an incredibly pervasive, widespread phenomenon.  So, if the Sainsbury-type view is correct, it seems that there will be no sets at all, or perhaps only sets of mathematical objects and the like.  This is a hard result to swallow, though, as Sainsbury himself points out.  At the very least, it is contrary to the way we often speak about the world. (253)  Perhaps a commitment to ontically vague sets, then, is indeed the best option.
The idea that there exist vague (mind-independent, language-independent) concepts is very closely related to the idea that there exist vague (mind-independent, language-independent) properties (and relations), so much so that Tye, e.g., addresses the issue in the following way: 

Like sets, some properties or concepts are vague. […] I take a property P to be vague only if (a) it could have borderline instances and (b) there is no determinate fact of the matter about whether there could be objects that are neither instances, borderline instances, nor-non instances. (536)​[3]​

So, baldness, e.g., is itself a vague property/concept, according to Tye, because there could be some people that neither determinately exemplify baldness nor determinately fail to exemplify this property/concept.  The notion of a vague property/concept like baldness (and a vague relation/concept like tallness) – in the Tye sense – appears parasitic on the idea that there exists vague sets – in the Tye sense – of bald individuals (and tall individuals); in general, if a property (or a relation) is vague, then this is in virtue of the fact that could be a vague set of objects (or a vague set of ordered pairs of objects, etc.) instantiating that property (or relation).  In other words, the notions here appear parasitic on the notion of a (possible) set of borderline instances.  Hence, vague properties (and relations) seem to stand or fall with (the possibility of) vague sets.  Given the prima facie reason above for thinking there are vague sets, then, we have prima facie reason for thinking there are vague properties (and relations).​[4]​
	As Trenton Merricks (2000), e.g., makes clear, any philosopher who is antecedently committed to a general theory of ontic vagueness as well as some fairly standard suppositions about the nature of propositions will automatically be committed to the existence of vague propositions. (145-6)  To illustrate, we are asked to consider the following sentence:

(H) Harry is bald.

Assuming that Harry is himself neither a determinately bald nor a determinately non-bald individual – i.e., he is a vaguely bald man – Merricks points out that a plausible view of propositions has it that the proposition expressed by (H) is neither true nor false.  That Harry instantiates baldness is indeterminate, and it is in this sense that the proposition is itself a vague constituent of the world.
Those with a thoroughgoing linguistic account of vagueness will (typically) deny that there is any ontic vagueness, and will hence deny that (H) expresses a vague proposition on the grounds that there simply is no unique proposition expressed by (H) at all – some claiming there is no unique proposition expressed by (H) because (H) fails to express any proposition whatsoever (yet (H) is still meaningful in virtue of other semantic facts), others claiming that (H) expresses a cloud of precise propositions (and is, in this sense, hyper-meaningful, or hyper-ambiguous).  Those with a thoroughgoing epistemic account of vagueness will also (typically) deny that there is ontic vagueness at all, and hence will also deny that (H) expresses a vague proposition, instead claiming that (H) expresses a determinately true or false, unknowable proposition.
Terence Parsons and Peter Woodruff (1995) have claimed that states of affairs are vague, and one plausible construal of their views has them simply providing an elaboration of the picture just given regarding vague propositions.  They state:

The world consists of some objects, and some properties and relations, with the objects possessing (or not possessing) properties and standing in (or not standing in) relations.  Call these possessings and standings-in states of affairs.  Then the world determines that certain of them hold, and that certain of them do not hold, but leaves the rest undetermined. [….]  On this view, it is states of affairs that are indeterminate. (322)

It is not perfectly clear whether they take states of affairs to be abstracta, but it is clear that many who have conceived of states of affairs in this same way do take them to be abstract.  Given some plausible assumptions about the contents of the expressions used in (H), some plausible assumptions about the contents of propositions, and some plausible assumptions about the roles played by states of affairs and propositions in an ontology that countenances both, it seems plausible to identify propositions with Parsonian/Woodruffian states of affairs.  So, one would believe, assert, fear, etc. some vague singular proposition P, e.g., if and only if one were to believe, assert, fear, etc. some state of affairs A, such that that for some individual I and for some property F that are the constituents of A, it is indeterminate whether I instantiates F.
	The extent to which it is reasonable to commit oneself to an ontology of vague objects, and in particular, an ontology of vague (traditional) abstracta, is a matter of how reasonable the (rival) thoroughgoing linguistic and epistemic theories of vagueness are, how reasonable the arguments against ontic vagueness in general are, and how reasonable the arguments for ontic vagueness are.  This is not the place for a full consideration of such topics; I will remain neutral here on much of these matters.  But I will not remain neutral on all of them.  For instance, I will argue below that certain abstracta are indeed metaphysically vague, and I will also argue below that if we have reason to believe in vague concreta, we have further reason to believe in vague abstracta.

3. Vaguely located abstracta: contingent artifacts and contingent groups of concreta

A great many contemporary philosophers assume that reality is exhausted by objects that are either concrete or abstract, and moreover, they assume that these two categories are exclusive. (I wish to challenge this latter assumption below.)  It has proven notoriously difficult, however, to say exactly what the distinction between concreta and abstracta consists in.  As David Lewis (1986) and others​[5]​ have pointed out, many seem content to rely on defining abstracta negatively; for example, one points to typically concrete entities – physical objects having spatiotemporal location – and then claims that abstract entities, whatever they are like, are not like that.  Abstracta are the furniture of the world that are not locatable in spacetime.
But this particular sort of negative definition of abstracta will not suffice.  Given some pretheoretic constraints on what sorts of things should count as abstract and which sorts of things should count as concrete, there seem to be abstract entities that have both temporal and spatial coordinates.  Consider the following remarks by John Burgess and Gideon Rosen (1997):

Imagine that in some remote galaxy at some remote future time there will exist a perfect double of our home planet, a Duplicate Earth.  There one will find duplicates of every concretum under the sun…
…[It] is tempting to say that the duplicate Jane Austen [living on Duplicate Earth] will not be a belated co-author with the original Jane Austen of Mansfield Park, but rather will be the author of a duplicate novel, Mansfield Park Redux…
It now seems natural to say that an Earthly…novel…is located on Earth, and its Doppelganger on Duplicate Earth, contrary to [the claim that all abstracta lack spatial location]; and that Earthly examples exist now, but the duplicates only at a remote later period, contrary to [the claim that all abstracta lack temporal location].  Or rather, that the duplicates don’t and won’t exist, since Duplicate Earth doesn’t and won’t, but that they would have if it had…(21-22)

And the following remarks by Rosen (2001):

[The cosine function and the Pythagorean Theorem] have no non-trivial spatial or temporal properties.  They have no spatial location, and they exist nowhere in particular in time.  But consider the game of chess.  […]  The natural view is that chess was invented at a certain place and time (though it may be hard to say exactly where or when); that before it was invented it did not exist at all; that it was imported from India into Persia in the 7th century; that it has changed in various respects over the years, and so on.  The only reason to resist this natural description would appear to be the thought that since chess is clearly an abstract object (it’s not a physical object, after all!), and since abstract objects do not exist in spacetime, (by definition!), chess must resemble the cosine function in its relation to space and time.  However, one might with equal justice regard the case of chess and other “artificial” abstract entities as a counterexample to the view that abstract objects in general possess only trivial spatial and temporal properties.

I think that these comments give us reason to believe that, if abstracta exist at all, some objects that intuitively ought to count as abstract – e.g., stories and chess games – are objects that indeed have spatiotemporal locations.  I will simply assume throughout the rest of this paper that we have grounds for believing in these sorts of abstracta, so, by modus ponens, we have grounds for believing in abstracta with spatiotemporal locations.
Of course, it may be correct to say there are unlocated abstract objects – those which exist “outside” of spacetime.  Perhaps this claim amounts to there being some abstract object such that, for every time and for every place, it is false that the object exists at that time or place.  Let us call abstract objects in this category platonic abstracta.  Many have claimed that all of the traditional abstracta discussed above are platonic.  This seems incorrect; I will say why below.  I will grant it for the purposes of this Section, though, and I will also admit that at least some of the traditional abstracta do indeed seem to be platonic.  At the very least, it seems that some sub-species of some of the traditional abstracta are platonic, e.g., sets of mathematical objects, uninstantiated properties, unrealized states of affairs, and the like (of course, provided such objects exist at all).
But let us put aside for now the question of which traditional abstracta fit into the above category, and let us instead focus on some nontraditional abstract objects that seem to fit into the mutually exclusive, general category of nonplatonic abstracta.  That is, let us focus on some abstracta that are not only distinct from sets, properties, concepts, propositions and states of affairs – which are furthermore not reducible to any of these entities – but clearly seem to have spatiotemporal locations in some sense.  What sorts of nontraditional abstracta would occupy this category?  I believe that a sufficient condition for being a member of this category is being either an abstract artifact or being a contingently existing abstract group of concreta.  (I am unsure if these are the only sorts of nontraditional abstracta in this category, but these are the only sorts I can currently conceive of).
Let us first consider abstract artifacts.  What I have in mind here are abstract entities that not only exist contingently but further depend on the activities of intentional agents for their existence.  Plausible candidates for abstracta of this sort include creatures of fiction,​[6]​ songs, poems, games, governmental laws, and social institutions.  According to one theory of fictional individuals that many currently favor,​[7]​ for instance, such individuals (e.g., Cinderella) exist, and fictional names (‘Cinderella’) are at times genuinely referential.  Cinderella is an artifact according to Artifactualism because she is the creation of the authors who first wrote about her (her existence also depends on the stories that must continually be told, kept in mind, etc. about her​[8]​), but she is an artifact that is different in kind from any ordinary concrete entity.  She is alleged to be an extant sui generis abstractum, irreducible to a set of properties or any other abstractum.
I assume that some (irreducible) abstract artifacts exist.  For convenience, I will stick with fictional individuals for present purposes.  While we must admit that fictional individuals are extant abstracta (if Artifactualism is correct), we should also admit that they (like whole stories and chess games) do have spatiotemporal locations.  Fictional individuals do seem to have temporal location because these entities, like all (actual) human artifacts, come into existence at some time or other, specifically, when the proper sorts of intentional acts of authors occur.  That is, it seems clearly correct that there is some time long ago at which Cinderella did not exist, and some other time not quite as long ago at which she came into existence.  Moreover, it seems clearly correct that Cinderella will cease to exist at some time; this may happen later rather than sooner, but when all of the copies of the literary work on which she depends and all intentional agents go out of existence, she will go out of existence.  So, there are times at which Cinderella exists and later times at which she does not.  Now, it seems that for any object that has the property of coming into existence at some time and the property of going out of existence at some later time, there is some temporal region between the earlier and later times that that object occupies.  So, Cinderella does, at least in some sense, have temporal location.  And likewise, Cinderella has spatial location.  Just as there are boundaries circumscribing a temporal region in which she exists, there are boundaries circumscribing a spatial region in which she exists.  Clearly it is incorrect to say that Cinderella exists on Venus or in the center of the earth.  No stories have ever been told about her in those locations.  It also seems clearly correct to me to say she exists around here – she is an Earthly entity – because stories about her abound on our planet.  So, there is some spatial region in which it is clearly correct to say that Cinderella exists within that region, and clearly incorrect to say that she exists outside of it.  Hence, extant fictional characters such as Cinderella, do in some sense, have spatiotemporal locations.  Hence, there are some nontraditional abstracta, viz., some abstract artifacts, that fit into the category of nonplatonic abstracta.
This may seem to be metaphysics gone haywire, and even some of the defenders of abstract artifacta believe this to be the case.  Amie Thomasson, one of the foremost proponents of Artifactualism, thinks attribution of non-trivial spatiotemporal properties (locations) to fictional individuals is fundamentally erroneous; doing so is tantamount to committing a sort of category mistake.​[9]​  In her (1999), she provides the following argument for thinking that fictional individuals lack spatiotemporal location.

Apart from the locations they are ascribed [by the literary works about them], the only other obvious candidate for the spatiotemporal location of a fictional character is to say that it is ‘in’ the literary work and so is wherever that work is.  But where are literary works?  Only a copy of the literary work, not the work itself, is in a particular location.  A literary work is only generically dependent on some copy (or memory) of it.  So although it may appear in various token copies, it cannot be identified with any of them because it may survive the destruction of any copy, provided there are more.  Nor can it be classified as a scattered object present where all of its copies are, because the work itself does not undergo any change in size, weight, or location if some of its copies are destroyed or moved.
…[And since fictional characters] are not constantly dependent on any particular spatiotemporal entity [such as a copy of a literary work], there is no reason to associate them with the spatiotemporal location of any of their supporting entities.
If fictional characters cannot be located either where they are said to be according to the story, or where copies of the literary works are located, in the absence of more plausible candidates it seems best to treat fictional characters simply as entities that lack a spatiotemporal location.  Indeed, that is just what we do in practice: Sophisticated readers treat fictional characters as lacking any spatiotemporal location, and thus as abstract in that sense. (36-7)

Thomasson’s reasoning could easily be adapted to show that all of the abstracta that I will be discussing in this Section and the next lack spatiotemporal location.  As it thus threatens to undermine virtually all of the current project, it is of vital importance to see if her argument is sound.
Of course, Thomasson is right that it would be ridiculous to think that the spatiotemporal location of a fictional character such as Cinderella could be discovered by appeal to the spatiotemporal locations ascribed to her in stories.  Moreover, I agree that it would be wrong to claim that Cinderella is located where any copy of a story about her is located.  But, given the apparent correctness of the claim that the nonplatonic category of abstracta is non-empty, it must be the case that something is wrong with Thomasson’s reasoning.  I believe the mistake lies in her inference from an entity not being located anywhere in particular to that entity not being located at all.
We can conceive of an object O that is not a scattered object composed of material parts, is an object definitely located in a large-ish region L, yet for any fairly well-defined, small-ish region S within L, it is not definitely true that O is located at S.  Nonetheless, it would be definitely correct to say that O is located within L, and definitely incorrect to say that the object is located at any region outside of L.  That is, we can conceive of a case in which it is indeterminate that O is located at any particular region S in L, but it is determinately true that O is located in L, and it is determinately false that O is located outside of L.  In other words, it is conceivable that there be vaguely located objects.  Not only is this conceivable, concrete micro-particles in our own world may be vague in this way; at least, this is one plausible way to understand what it is for a quark or a gluon to be in a superposition.  More to the point, it seems that we may conceive of some abstracta, e.g., contingent artifacts such as fictional individuals, chess games, and marriage, that have vague location.  For these reasons I think Thomasson’s argument fails; while her comments correctly imply that fictional individuals cannot be assigned determinate locations, it incorrectly implies that they cannot be assigned any locations whatsoever.  Some abstracta are not only nonplatonic (as Burgess and Rosen give us reason to believe), but some of these nonplatonic abstracta are vaguely located in spacetime.
Now, in addition to abstract artifacts, it seems that contingent groups of concreta also fit into the category of vaguely located, nonplatonic abstracta.  By ‘contingent group of concreta’, I have in mind entities that are quite similar to sets of concreta, but are instead entities whose components (we will use this to distinguish such concreta from concrete members of sets) are not essential (and let us say that a component belongs to a group to distinguish this relation from membership).​[10]​
Perhaps species of animals are contingent groups of concreta; it seems plausible to me, anyway, to identify the species tiger with the abstract group of tigers.  This species depends for its existence on component tigers, and it seems to me to be vaguely located within the region circumscribed by these component tigers in the same way that Cinderella is vaguely located within the region circumscribed by the story-copies, memories, etc., about her.  (Yet if Tom the tiger dies, the group remains – assuming, of course, that Tom was not the last tiger in existence – just as Cinderella may survive the destruction of any one story-copy about her.)  That is, it would be definitely correct to say that the species tiger exists where its disparate dependent bases exist, definitely incorrect to say that this species is located at any region outside of these boundaries, and definitely incorrect to say that there is some particular sub-region within those boundaries at which the species exists.
Or perhaps entities like the New York Yankees count as abstract group of concreta; it seems plausible to me, anyway, that this team is vaguely located within the region circumscribed by Yankee players and other Yankee components (Yet, if we remove a pitcher, say by trading Randy Johnson to the Boston Red Sox, the Yankees remain.)
The species tiger and the New York Yankees, like Cinderella and the game of chess, ought not count as concrete entities.  They depend in various ways on concrete entities, but it is crucial to notice that they do not depend on concreta in the way that ordinary, scattered concrete objects do.  With ordinary scattered concreta, an object’s material parts are in relatively disparate locations; with an abstract artifact or a contingent group of concreta, it is the dependent bases that are in relatively disparate locations (e.g., components), but these do not bear parthood in any case to the dependent entities.  Although we may loosely speak this way, Randy Johnson is literally not a part of the Yankees; rather, he is a component belonging to the Yankees.  The traditional tenets of mereology simply do no apply to things like teams, species, songs, and fictional individuals.​[11]​
However, the Yankees, the species tiger, Cinderella, Mansfield Park, and the game of chess do have spatiotemporal locations in virtue of their dependent bases having location, as do ordinary, scattered concreta.  For instance, the Yankees came into existence roughly in the early 1900’s, and someday this team will cease to exist; moreover, this team is an Earthly, and not a Venutian entity.  And given the disparate locations of its dependent bases (i.e., players, team managers, etc.) and the fact these bases bear some relation other than parthood to it (whatever that relation may turn out to be), it seems best to accord vague location to this object.  It is definitely current and Earthly, definitely not Venutian nor Medieval, but within its current Earthly confines, it is indeterminate where it is located.​[12]​

4. Vaguely located abstracta: traditional abstracta

Not only are some abstract artifacts and contingent groups of concreta seemingly nonplatonic and vaguely located, some of the traditional abstracta discussed in Section 2 seem to be nonplatonic and vaguely located.
Sets are among the traditional abstracta.  But take any set of concreta, such as the set of red things.  Even if Sainsbury is right and it is a completely determinate matter whether for every set S and every entity E, E is a member of S, S could still count as a vague object in the sense that it is vaguely located object.  Lewis (1986) and Rosen (2001), among others,​[13]​ have independently echoed some of the above comments about groups of concreta having spatiotemporal locations and applied them to sets of concreta.
Lewis:





It is not unnatural to say that a set of books is located on a certain shelf in the library.  So why not say that the sets containing Peter and Paul exist wherever and whenever Peter and Paul themselves exist, and that in general an impure set exists where and when its spatiotemporally located members are located?  To be sure, nothing in set theory forces us to say this.  But the applications of set theory to the concrete domain are not inconsistent with this manner of speaking.  So, while it may be clear that the impure sets are abstract and not concrete, it is quite unclear whether they fail to exist in space in much the same sense in which paradigmatic concreta exist in space.

So, the set whose members are the Eiffel Tower and Mt. Everest is abstract, yet it, like entities discussed in the previous Section, seems to have an Earthly spatiotemporal location.  Sets, it is plausible to assume, are entities that have their members essentially; unlike the entities discussed in the preceding Section, if one dependent base of a set is lost, the set ceases to be.  But similar to the entities of the preceding Section, no concrete set member is also a part of the set of which it is a member – so it likewise seems wrong to say the set is a scattered object like a scattered concrete object, having the sort of location such objects are supposed to have. (This is a bit contrary to some of what Lewis and Rosen say – more on this below – but the primary aim of including their above remarks is merely to capture the apparent nonplatonic status of sets.)  Again, though, it does seem right to say that this set has location in some sense.  As with the entities in the previous section, the set of the Eiffel Tower and Mt. Everest exists nowhere in particular – it cannot be located, e.g., in Paris or Nepal – but it definitely does exist somewhere within those borders, and it definitely does not exist on Venus.
Also among the traditional abstracta are properties/concepts and propositions/states of affairs, and some of these entities seem to be nonplatonic and vaguely located.​[14]​  One may believe in uninstantiated properties/concepts and unrealized propositions/states of affairs.  If such abstracta exist, I would suppose them to be spatiotemporally unlocated (i.e., platonic).  But it seems to me that propositions/states of affairs exist only when their constituents do; the Eiffel Tower’s being orange only exists because the Eiffel Tower and being orange exist.  And it seems there is no reason to think the property/concept being orange would have ever existed if there were never any concrete instances of orange entities.  So, as before, (some of) the abstracta under consideration now likewise seem to ultimately depend for their existence on disparate concrete individuals.​[15]​  So, as with abstract artifacts, groups of concreta, and sets of concreta, the individuals on which (some) properties/concepts and propositions/states of affairs depend occupy spatiotemporal locations that circumscribe the spatiotemporal regions of those properties/concepts and propositions/states of affairs.  So, for all the same reasons as before, the locations of (some of) these objects seem vague as well.​[16]​
This discussion brings me to a second reason to believe in vaguely located abstracta, or more accurately, a conditional reason.  Suppose those who claim that there is vagueness in the concrete realm are correct.  I claim that if there are fuzzy borders for concreta (due, presumably, to indeterminacy in the parthood relation), there will be an “added layer” of locational vagueness for some nonplatonic abstracta.  Not only will some nonplatonic abstracta be vague in virtue of being smeared across an indeterminate region occupied by their dependent bases, but they will be vague in virtue of having fuzzy borders.  This will be due to the fact that the there is fuzziness in the borders of the concreta comprising their dependent bases.
An example may help here.  Consider the unit set of the Eiffel Tower.  If the Eiffel Tower is a precise object, then the unit set of the Eiffel Tower may not be vague in the way I have been discussing throughout this paper; it may be a nonplatonic abstractum with a determinate location (unlike the set of the Eiffel Tower and Everest).  However, if the Eiffel Tower is itself vague, even the unit set of the Eiffel Tower may be vaguely located in this secondary sense – it may occupy an indeterminate region due to the fact that it depends for its existence on a concretum that occupies an indeterminate region.

5. Objections and replies: why this is a novel category of genuinely ontically vague objects

I wish now to consider some objections to the view that I have presented here and offer some replies.
There are two fundamental sorts of objections that I can envision.  The first is the worry that there is just no phenomenon of vagueness here to account for at all.  The second admits that there is a phenomenon to account for, but that it is better accounted for with a linguistic or an epistemic theory of vagueness.  The second objection is an instance of a very fundamental sort, a type of objection that any theory of vague objects must face.
Let us look at the first sort of objection.  I claim to be presenting here a theory of vague abstract objects, but one may wonder why ‘vague’ would apply to entities having location in this way, if any do at all.  After all, some hallmarks of vagueness seem absent, or at least questionably present.  For example, it is not obvious how one would construct a sorites paradox appealing to entities such as fictional characters, sets of concreta, teams and their locations in the way that it is obvious how to construct such a paradox when making an appeal to grains of sand and heap-formation or hairs on heads and baldness; the locations of such entities likewise do not seem to obviously admit of borderline cases in the way that there are borderline cases of heaps and bald people.  But the following hallmark of vagueness is at least present, however: indeterminacy.  Just as Tye (1990), e.g., claims that ‘Everest’ (precisely) refers to a vague concrete object in virtue of referring to an entity having indeterminate spatial borders, I claim that ‘Cinderella’, ‘orangehood’, ‘the Eiffel Tower’s being orange’, ‘the New York Yankees’, etc., all refer to vague abstract objects in virtue of referring to entities having indeterminate spatiotemporal location.  Cinderella is determinately not a 10th Century Venutian object (as Everest is determinately not an object with parts in India), is determinately a 20th Century Earthly object (as Everest is determinately an object with parts in Nepal), yet the precise location of Cinderella cannot be pinned down; that is, within the region she exists, it is impossible to determinately pinpoint any well-defined earthly spatiotemporal location for her (just as Tye claims it is impossible to determinately pinpoint any well-defined spatial border for Everest).
Another way to put forth an objection of the first sort, however, is as follows.  Even if one was tempted to be on board with thinking that abstract artifacts such as fictional characters have vague location, one may be wondering at this point why we do not just say that groups of concreta, sets of concreta, properties/concepts and propositions/states of affairs have determinate locations, viz., they exist precisely in the scattered regions consisting of the locations of their dependent concrete bases.  That is, even if one is tempted to think that while Cinderella is plausibly not a scattered object precisely located where (“difficult-to-pin-down”) story-copies, memories, etc., about her are located, the set of the Eiffel Tower and Everest is disanalogous because it is precisely located in the scattered region consisting of the locations of its two (“easy-to-pin-down”) members.
In response, I do not think it is plausible to claim that any such entities have their locations in the way that scattered material objects have location.  That is, I think it is implausible to claim that games, sets of concreta, social institutions, fictional characters and the like exist precisely in the scattered region comprised of the locations of their dependent bases.​[17]​  If such entities were to exist precisely where their dependent bases are, that would seem to accord them – one and all – with the sort of location that material objects with material parts have.  Their locations would just be fusions of regions of spacetime.  But what regions of spacetime could comprise the relevant fusions?  It does not seem plausible to claim that the regions so-fused are the ones occupied by the concrete bases on which such abstracta depend.  The fusion of those regions is nothing over and above the concretum comprised of those regions; that is, the fusion in such cases just is the regions so-fused.  But intuitively abstract entities such as fictional characters, sets, groups, properties, and propositions are entities that must be distinct from the fusions of the spacetime regions occupied by the concrete bases on which they depend; if true abstracta, they must remain over and above the regions so-fused.
The precise-world theorist (one who denies all ontic vagueness) would, of course, claim the alternative metaphysical picture is preferable.  One prominent defender of the linguistic theory of vagueness, Lewis (1986), has indirectly addressed this issue with the following remarks about sets:

Sets are supposed to be abstract.  But a set of located things does seem to have a location: it is where its members are.  Thus my unit set is right here, exactly where I am; the set of you and me is partly here where I am, partly yonder where you are; and so on. (83)

While he does not use ‘exactly’ to describe the location of the two-membered set, he would take the two-membered set of concreta, like the unit set, to be precisely located where its (precise) dependent bases are located.  But what is implausible about this option is the implication that the set of you and I is partly here, partly there.  Unlike Lewis, I doubt that mereology applies to sets or any other abstract object.  One of the members of the two-membered set is here, one there, but membership is distinct from parthood, and neither you nor I is a part of the set.  Abstracta, including nonplatonic abstracta such as sets, fictional characters, properties and propositions, are atomic simples;​[18]​ as such, it does not seem plausible to me to claim that they have location in the same way composite concreta have location.​[19]​
I instead endorse the spirit in the following comments by Burgess and Rosen (1997):
	
According to the metaphysicians, the region occupied by the set of all horses is just the region occupied by the set of all horses considered together (that is, by the mass of all horse-flesh).  One part of this region is the region occupied by all horse-heads.  This is the region occupied by the set of all horse-heads, but that set presumably is not a part of the set of all horses in the way that, say, the set of all race-horses is.  Thus the manner of location of properties of concrete particulars and sets of concrete particulars does seem to differ from the manner of location of the particular individuals themselves. (23)

The manner of location of properties of concrete particulars and sets of concrete particulars does differ from the manner of location of concrete individuals because the relationships that are borne by the dependent entities of the former two types of entities to their spatiotemporally disparate dependent bases, viz., instantiation and membership, are fundamentally different relations from the relationship borne by a concrete entity to its spatiotemporally disparate dependent bases, viz., parthood.  The manner of location the former two types of entities, I claim, is best taken to be of the novel sort described here: vague location.
How about the second sort of objection?  It runs as follows.  Even if we assume that some abstracta are nonplatonic and that there is indeed a phenomenon of vague location to be accounted for, we do not need to admit that any such entity is itself vague in the sense of having indeterminate spatiotemporal location.  Our language and our thoughts are often indeterminate, and they may imprecisely refer, but the entities referred to by ‘Cinderella’, ‘the game of chess’, and ‘marriage’, are themselves precise in all respects, spatiotemporal location included.  And since we can use the resources of either a linguistic or an epistemic theory of vagueness to adequately explain how such vagueness arises in language about locations or thoughts about locations, we simply have no further need to burden ourselves with the mysterious ontology proposed.  That is, we have no need to posit a world that is furnished with vague objects, vaguely located abstracta in particular.  The abstract world, just like the concrete world, is wholly determinate.​[20]​
The successfulness of this sort of objection clearly turns on whether the linguistic theory or the epistemic theory of vagueness can better explain how an appeal to vague elements of language or vague thoughts accounts for the phenomena under consideration here: the apparent vague location of some abstracta.  So let us consider the basics of each theory in turn.
The linguistic theory of vagueness has it that vagueness is a feature merely of our representations of the world, not the world itself.  Natural languages are the bearers of vagueness, and the root cause of vagueness in language is semantic indecision.  ‘Everest’, e.g., is a vague name in English because our language is incapable of determining which one of the millions of precise candidate fusions of concrete bits is the referent of the name; ‘bald’ is a vague predicate because our language is incapable of specifying a precise number of hairs governing the application of the predicate.  And so on.
The epistemic theory of vagueness, on the other hand, has it that vagueness is also merely a feature merely of our representations of the world, but the root cause of vagueness is instead taken to be ignorance.  The world is wholly precise, however, we can in principle never know when our representations are accurately representing the world.  There is precisely one among the millions of precise candidate fusions of concrete bits that our belief about Everest is truly about, it is just that we must forever be in the dark about which one it is; there is a precise number of hairs governing the correct application of the term ‘bald’, it is just that we can never have epistemic access to that number.  For these reasons, thoughts about Everest are vague and the predicate ‘bald’ is vague.  And so on.
However, if we take the route of either sort of precise-world theorist, i.e., we take the route of either the linguistic theorist or the epistemic theorist, we are forced to make some implausible claims – claims about nonplatonic abstracta that seem to me much more suspect than the ones I am endorsing.
Consider, for example, the precise-world theorist’s account of the apparent vagueness of a fictional character such as Cinderella, illustrated in the following way.  (I will assume, hopefully not uncharitably, that such a theorist would take the name ‘Cinderella’ to be vague rather than the expressions ‘is located’ or ‘location X’).  Suppose that there are three locations, L1, L2, and L3, such that it is determinately true that Cinderella is in L1, L2, or L3, but for no one of L1, L2, or L3, is it determinately true that she is at that particular location.  Now suppose there are three abstract entities, A1, A2, and A3, such that A1 is determinately located at L1, A2 is determinately located at L2, and A3 is determinately located at L3.  Now, if the precise-world theorist favors the linguistic account of vagueness, ‘Cinderella’ would simply be indeterminate in reference among A1, A2, and A3.  If she is one who favors the epistemic account, ‘Cinderella’ would refer to one of the three precise candidate abstracta, yet we would be ignorant as to which one.​[21]​
The problem I have with this sort of challenge to my view concerns the legitimacy of the precisifications, A1, A2, and A3.  ‘Cinderella’, if the name refers at all, is assumed to refer to a sui generis, partless abstractum.  As I pointed out in my reply to the first sort of objection, it thus seems that Cinderella herself must exist over and above the fusions of her dependent concrete bases.  But it seems that this can only be the case if A1 is something over and above L1, A2 is something over and above L2, and A3 is something over and above L3.  But if A1 must be something over and above L1, etc., A1 simply cannot be located determinately at L1, etc.  If it could, we would have to admit, absurdly, that the abstractum A1 would have the same properties of whatever concretum (if any) occupies region L1.




The view I have here presented is one in which some nonplatonic abstracta are vague in the sense of being indeterminately located.  I have not claimed that all nonplatonic abstracta are vague in this sense, that all abstracta are nonplatonic, or that any concretum is vague.  I simply maintain that there are some abstract objects that we cannot rightly ascribe a determinate location to, even if the bases on which they depend have a determinate location.  The location of a fictional object, e.g., is an indeterminate matter.  We can determinately say that Cinderella is Earthly, but that is analogous to saying that a 5’10” man is a middling case of being tall.  Just as it is determinate that the latter is a borderline case of a tall man, it is determinate that the former is hereabouts on Earth.  And again, Cinderella is not like a scattered material object located where its dependent bases are located, i.e., its concrete parts; it would of course be silly to claim that a part of her exists in Mississippi, and another part of her exists in Wales, etc.  But Cinderella is related to a scattered material object in the sense that the things on which she depends are concrete.  Cinderella’s existence depends on abstract stories (albeit no particular one) about her, and these ultimately depend on concrete Cinderella story-copies.  And like a scattered object, the location of Cinderella will change (pace Thomasson’s earlier-quoted remarks) when a story about her goes out of existence in a particular region or pops up in another.  If a story about Cinderella is one day told on Mars, then Mars is now a part of the region in which she is located.  In general, nonplatonic, vaguely located abstracta are indeterminately located in a spatiotemporal region that has as its borders the time and place of the beginning entities on which they depend and the time and place of the demise of those dependent bases.  Within these borders, the spatial location of the dependent entity – the region such that, somewhere within, it determinately can be found – is capable of expanding and contracting.  It expands as the dependent bases become more spread out, it contracts as the dependent bases become less spread out.
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^1	  In my (2003), I engage in a preliminary discussion of the issues I will take up here.
^2	  By ‘vague set’ I do not mean fuzzy set, i.e., a set corresponding to a function from objects to real numbers, where the value of the function for argument x is the real number that provides the degree to which x is a member of a particular set.
^3	  On the face of it, it might seem odd that Tye feels the need to include condition (b).  See p. 535 for his discussion concerning why it is needed.  I am unclear if it must be included, but I am sure that nothing in the present discussion turns on its inclusion.
^4	  The discussion surrounding vague properties and relations has been focused largely on whether or not the property of existence and the relation of identity are (or could be) vague.  There is an abundance of literature on these topics; however, one may see, e.g., Theodore Sider (2003) for a discussion of vague existence, or the most oft-cited article concerning vague identity, Gareth Evans’ (1978).
^5	  One may also see Gideon Rosen (2001).
^6	  I have in mind here the sorts of entities discussed in Peter van Inwagen (1974).
^7	  Prominent defenders of Artifactualism include not only include van Inwagen, but Saul Kripke (1973), Nathan Salmon (1998), and Amie Thomasson (1999).
^8	  See Thomasson (1999) for an elaboration of the various dependence relations here.
^9	  I use ‘non-trivial’ because Thomasson does admit that fictional characters have temporal properties, but demurs about location of any sort.  The ‘category mistake’ assertion comes from personal correspondence.
^10	  Group of concreta is a sui generis ontological category; groups of concreta are irreducible to sets of concreta (or at least so I believe).  In adopting this ontology I am here following Gabriel Uzquiano (2004).  (Some of the terminology I will be using will differ from Uzquiano’s, however.)  Uzquiano does not explicitly claim, as I do, that groups of concreta are abstract, but he does say that they seem “not to be material.” (136)
^11	  For example, parthood is transitive, while belonging is not.  Modifying an example from Uzquiano (137), while it is clear that Randy Johnson’s hand is a part of his arm and hence a part of him, it is not the case that his hand belongs to the Yankees.  People, not hands, are what comprise baseball teams.  See, e.g., Peter Simons (1987) for a discussion of the traditional tenets of mereology.
^12	  Nontraditional abstracta may also be vague in some of the ways that the traditional abstracta were alleged to be vague, as discussed in section 2.  Is the team doctor a Yankee component?  Is this radical reinterpretation set in the Amazon jungle truly a Cinderella story?  Questions such as these may have no determinate answer.
^13	  See also Uzquiano (2004), e.g.
^14	  It should be no surprise that someone like Lewis who reduces properties, propositions, not to mention events, to sets would take such entities to be entities with locations (although he does not take their locations to be vague – more on this below).  In general, however, I will be ignoring here many such nonplatonic abstracta that may seem to be reducible to various abstract entities already discussed in either the traditional or nontraditional category, such as the ones just mentioned, or laws of nature, or facts, etc.
^15	  Of course, I do not wish to say that all properties/concepts and states of affairs/propositions ultimately depend on concrete individuals.  For example, the property being identical to 2 does not depend on any concrete individual, nor does the state of affairs 2’s being the only even prime.
^16	  This view about the locations of properties seems to fly directly in the face of one view about properties that also takes them to have spatiotemporal locations, viz., the view that takes them to be wholly located where each of their instances is located.  But given a common-sense sort of understanding of “wholly”, it just seems incredible to me that anything could be wholly located in distinct regions, and more to the point, it seems much harder to fathom than a property’s occupying an indeterminate region bound by its instances.
^17	  That is, nonplatonic abstracta of the sort I just mentioned.  Perhaps it is correct to say that some nonplatonic abstracta have determinate locations, for instance, the unit set of one precise concretum.
^18	  They are simples in the sense of literally having no parts; the abstracta being discussed here do not obey the traditional tenets of mereology.  This is not to say, of course, that they cannot have components, or constituents, or structure, etc.
^19	  I do not claim that the conclusion that such entities are located in a relevantly different sort of way from the way scattered objects are located – namely the metaphysically vague sort of way I have been discussing – follows necessarily from anything said so far.  That is, I think that for all I have said so far, the following is still a logical possibility: the dependent concrete bases may not bear parthood to their respective dependent abstract entities, and still the locations of the dependent abstract entities may be determinately located where its dependent concrete bases are located.  While this is a logical possibility, it is just does not seem to me to be as plausible as the alternative I have been discussing.  We currently have a decent understanding of how objects are located when they are scattered material objects with material parts; we do not have a decent understanding of how abstract objects lacking parts of any sort could possibly have scattered location.  But more to the point, admitting that this logical possibility is actually the case seems to do too much violence to a pretheoretic distinction between abstracta and concreta that ought to be maintained.
^20	  This is a very rough adaptation of an argument Mark Heller (1996) gives against metaphysical vagueness.
^21	  The precise-world theorist may also at this point supplement her metaphysical view with a supervaluationist semantics.  And I admit that such a semantics could potentially provide the resources to utter truths about vaguely located abstracta.  See my (2003) for a brief discussion of this.  However, this would not do away with the implausibility of the underlying precise-world metaphysics, as I discuss below.
^22	  I wish to reiterate at this point what I say in footnote 19.
